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Since the 1960s, more than 2 trillion US dollars have been spent on foreign aid by mem-
ber countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In recent
years, ocial development assistance (ODA) exceeded 100 billion US dollars per year.
In 2010, the DAC members each intend to spend between 0.2% (USA) and 1.0% (Nor-
way and Sweden) of their GNI as ODA. Despite this enormous eort, there are still
very poor countries in the world that rely heavily on external resources. Some of the
poorest countries, such as Timor-Leste or the Democratic Republic of Congo, show a
share of development aid in gross national income above 50% [Worldbank (2009)].
Against this background, a controversial discussion is held about the eectiveness
of foreign aid. The major questions are whether aid promotes economic growth, and
under which circumstances aid is more or less eective. A large empirical literature has
emerged in the past 35 years studying this research question. The main result of this
literature is that aid has no signicant direct impact on growth [see, e.g., Doucouliagos
and Paldam (2009a)]. However, there seem to exist particular institutional features
in developing countries that make aid more or less eective. One positive feature is a
`good policy' environment, which was initially studied by Burnside and Dollar (2000).1
The conclusion from this body of literature is straightforward: give more aid to those
countries that meet this criterion and help other countries to build performance-
enhancing political conditions. However, the result has been criticized by Easterly
(2003), Easterly et al. (2004) and others, so the literature has begun to focus on other
determinants of aid eectiveness, such as geographic location [Dalgaard et al. (2004)],
political stability [Islam (2005)] or rent-seeking activities [Economides et al. (2008)].
One issue that has been neglected so far is the design of the federal systems of aid-
receiving countries. This is quite surprising, as national and supranational develop-
ment agencies consider decentralization as a major part of their anti-poverty programs.
For instance, between 1993 and 1997, around 12% of the World Bank projects com-
pleted involved decentralizing responsibilities to lower levels of government [Litvack
et al. (1998)]. The reason for considering decentralization in anti-poverty programs
is that it may have a direct positive eect on economic development and growth
[Oates (1972)]. Decentralization brings the government closer to the people so that
local ocials are better informed about the local needs and are thus better able to
provide the optimal mix of local policies. This increase in eciency contributes to
economic growth [Oates (1993)]. The decentralization theorem may also be important
for aid eectiveness. If local bureaucrats have better information about local needs,
1For comprehensive literature surveys, see McGillivray et al. (2006), Roodman (2007), Rajan and Subra-
manian (2008), Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009a), and Lessmann and Markwardt (2009).
2they may also have an advantage in selecting the most eective development projects
to be nanced by foreign aid. According to Oates, foreign aid should therefore be
more eective in decentralized countries. However, the eciency-enhancing eect of
decentralization may be undermined by factors such as coordination problems, exces-
sive regulation, administrative costs, and corruption or cronyism. These problems are
much more likely to occur in developing countries than in developed ones, so the direct
growth impact of decentralization is debatable, as is the impact on aid eectiveness.
Assume, for example, a poor country in which local governments are formed by local
elite groups. Within such a framework, it is unlikely that aid is spent eectively at
the local level, as the elite groups favor spending the money at the benet of their
members instead of spending the money on the most eective projects from a growth
perspective [Bardhan (2002), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)]. In such a situation,
decentralization would decrease aid eectiveness.
We further argue that the result regarding decentralization depends on the parti-
cular federal design of aid-receiving countries as well as the aid modality. If, for
example, local bureaucrats are held accountable through local elections, the eciency-
enhancing eect of decentralization may overweigh the disadvantages mentioned. Si-
multaneously, rent-seeking activities are much more likely to occur if the development
assistance comes in the form of grants or loans instead of technical assistance. If donor
countries concede technical assistance at the local level, it is much more dicult for
the elites to embezzle money as in the case of a general budget, as spending decisions
are inuenced and controlled by the donor. In this context, Doucouliagos and Paldam
state that "researchers should focus their attention away from aggregate measures of
aid to more disaggregate ones." [Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009b), p. 7].
In light of these multi-faceted arguments, the aim of our paper is to investigate the
impact of dierent types of decentralization on the eectiveness of dierent aid moda-
lities. To answer this research question, we estimate a commonly used growth model
based on a panel data set of 72 developing countries. In doing so, we use various
indicators for scal and political decentralization and distinguish between alternative
types of foreign aid. Our main nding is that scal decentralization has a negative
impact on aid eectiveness, while political decentralization has no signicant eect or
even a positive one. The negative impact of scal decentralization is robust for grants
and overall development assistance, while the growth impact of loans and technical
assistance does not depend on decentralization. Our results have important implica-
tions for the optimal mix of anti-poverty programs, especially for those which involve
decentralization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature and
discusses the impact of decentralization on the eectiveness of foreign aid. Section
33 discusses the econometric specication and underlying data. The empirical results
are discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2 The theory of decentralization and aid eectiveness
Decentralization is in vogue in developing countries, at least because donor countries
and international development agencies consider decentralization as an important ele-
ment in their anti-poverty programs. The main argument in favor of decentralization
is based on the decentralization theorem: the transfer of powers to sub-national go-
vernments increases public-sector eciency, thus promoting economic development
[Oates (1972), Oates (1993)]. Decentralized authorities are much better informed re-
garding local needs and can provide the economically ecient quantity and quality
of local public goods. Especially in the case of a federation with heterogeneous re-
gions, decentralized ocials are in a better position to meet local demands [Oates
(1972)]. Another argument in favor of decentralization is the role of local govern-
ments in preserving markets [Weingast (1995)]. The idea is that the government acts
as monopolist and has the power to exploit the private sector [Shleifer and Vishny
(1993)]. In a decentralized setting, local governments compete on mobile factors. This
scal and institutional competition limits the government's ability to extract rents,
enhancing economic eciency and thus economic growth.
The main question is how decentralization aects aid eectiveness. The eciency
argument above can also be used in this context. Local governments are better in-
formed regarding local demands and are thus in a better position to allocate aid to
the most useful projects compared to the central government. If foreign aid is aimed
at overcoming the shortness of local public goods, such as infrastructure, schools, or
health care, then decentralization should increase the eciency of public services and
aid eectiveness. The competition argument is also relevant in light of the limited
amount of aid available in developing countries. Sub-national jurisdictions have an
incentive to perform well in exchange for aid payments increasing aid eectiveness.
From this point of view, decentralization should increase aid eectiveness.
However, several economic researchers deny the positive eects of decentralization for
developing countries. Swaroopa et al. (2000) analyze the fungibility of aid in fede-
ral systems and nd that aid merely substitutes for spending that the government
would have undertaken anyway. Moreover, aid received by sub-national governments
decreases central government transfers in a similar amount. From a political economy
perspective, Prud'homme (1995) argues that in decentralized countries, there are more
opportunities for corruption at the local level, as local politicians and bureaucrats are
more likely to be subject to the pressing demands of local interest groups. In addi-
4tion, local decision makers usually possess more discretionary powers than national
ocials, increasing the possible negative eects of decentralization. In the same vein,
Tanzi (1996) argues that local ocials live closer to the citizens, and this contiguity
leads to a higher impact by local interest groups on local policy outcomes. Bardhan
and Mookherjee provide a formal analytical framework to investigate the eects of
decentralization on the provision of public service in developing countries, conside-
ring the capture of local governments [Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)]. With local
capture, dened by an elite group receiving a larger weight in the local government's
welfare function, there is a tendency for the local government to provide excessive
services to the local elite at the expense of the non-elite [see also Bardhan (2002)].2
The DAC and the aid-receiving countries identify rent-seeking and corruption as the
most important obstacles for economic growth and aid eectiveness [OECD (2008)].
These problems may also occur if local bureaucrats decide on the allocation of foreign
aid to local development projects. Therefore, aid may be less eective in decentralized
countries due to corruption and cronyism.
The quality of bureaucrats is also an important factor for the relationship between aid,
growth, and decentralization. Prud'homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996) argue that cen-
tral government bureaucracies are likely to attract more qualied people because they
oer better career opportunities and higher salaries [Brueckner (2000)]. If qualied in-
dividuals are abundant, as in most industrial countries, sub-national governments may
have sta that is as qualied as those in national governments. In developing coun-
tries, however, educational standards are low and qualied human capital is scarce.
Therefore, under decentralization, sub-national government ocials entrusted with
aid disposition may be less qualied for this task than central bureaucrats, reducing
the eectiveness of aid. The previous discussion shows that the hypothesis regarding
the relationship between aid eectiveness and the federal government structure is well
grounded in the theoretical literature.
An issue not yet discussed is aid modality. Not all arguments mentioned are relevant to
each type of foreign assistance. Consider, for instance, grants vs. technical assistance.
Unconditional grants add to the general governments' budget, and we can easily
assume that they go to lower levels of government through the budgetary process in a
manner similar to that used for other kinds of revenue. Following the decentralization
theorem, the growth impact of unconditional grants should be higher in decentralized
countries. However, if there are corrupt or badly educated bureaucrats at the local
level, the positive eect of those payments is weakened. In the past, unconditional
grants have been one of the most important types of aid because debt reliefs are
2An empirical study by Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) shows that decentralization has indeed a negative
impact on corruption if the monitoring of bureaucrats does not work, which is the case in most aid-receiving
countries.
5nothing else then unconditional grants.
In contrast, technical assistance has dierent eects. Assume that a donor country
sends development aid workers to construct schools or basic infrastructure in an aid-
receiving country. In this case, decentralization should be advantageous, as local
bureaucrats have better knowledge on the best location than central bureaucrats.
However, most importantly, the potentially adverse eects of decentralization are less
pronounced now. Most of the monetary value of technical assistance comes in the
form of personnel costs and material costs accrued by the donor himself. Due to this
fact, it is much more dicult to dissipate or to embezzle the money, as the monetary
value cannot be transferred to personal bank accounts. Of course, local elite groups
can still try to inuence the donor to carry out construction at the location that is
best suited for their members and in a way that involves politically connected local
rms. But the problem should be less eminent as in the case of unconditional grants
or loans. Our example shows, that aid modality matters in our context.
Another question to be discussed is the role of the particular federal design of aid-
receiving countries in this context. The decentralization theorem requires that sub-
national governments have a certain amount of authorities in decision making. This
aspect is measured generally by the degree of scal decentralization, such as the share
of sub-national government expenditures in total government expenditures. However,
having a high degree of scal decentralization does not necessarily imply that sub-
national jurisdictions have autonomy in decision-making. It is also possible that cen-
tral governments devolve responsibilities and nancial resources to local governments,
but the fulllment of tasks at the local level is dened by the central government's
legislature. In this case, measures of scal decentralization are merely an insucient
indicator for the real autonomy of sub-national governments. It is therefore important
to consider the degree of political decentralization, that is, whether local governments
make spending decisions autonomously [Fan et al. (2009)]. Measures of political de-
centralization are also important in the context of local government accountability.
In contrast to scal decentralization, which strengthens accountability only indirectly
through inter-jurisdictional competition, political decentralization may directly im-
pact local government accountability through local elections. If there are elections at
the local level then local governments are directly accountable for their actions. In this
case, the discussed negative eects of decentralization on aid eectiveness through,
for example, corruption and cronyism at the local level are unlikely to occur. Our dis-
cussion shows that the theoretical literature implies that decentralization impacts aid
eectiveness in one way or another. Also, both aid modality as well as the particular
federal design of aid receiving countries matter in this context. The following section
tests these relationships empirically.
63 Empirical analysis
Our theoretical discussion suggests that the degree of decentralization in aid-receiving
countries may determine aid eectiveness. Following Oates' decentralization theorem,
aid should be more eective in decentralized countries and therefore stimulate more
growth. At the same time, decentralization may have reverse eects, such as through
increased corruption and cronyism or through poor bureaucratic quality at the lo-
cal government level. Moreover, the aid modality should also have an inuence on
the relationship between aid, decentralization, and growth. In light of these oppo-
sing arguments, this section studies the eectiveness of aid on economic growth by
considering both the degree of decentralization and the aid modality in aid-receiving
countries. Our empirical work attempts to answer two key questions: (1) Is the eect
of aid on growth conditional on the federal structure of aid-receiving countries? (2)
Do aid modality and the federal style in particular matter in this context?
3.1 Econometric specication
To answer our research questions, we estimate variants of a well-established time-
eects panel data model. The basic growth regression for N countries and T time
periods, where countries are indexed by i and time by t, has the following form:
^ yi;t = yi;t +
k X
j=1
jcontrolj;i;t + 1aidi;t + 2deci;t + 3(aidi;t  deci;t) + t + i;t: (1)
Here, ^ yi;t is the real per capita GDP growth rate, yi;t is the logarithm of the initial real
per capita GDP at the beginning of each period, controlj;i;t are k exogenous control
variables aecting growth, aidi;t represents aid receipts relative to GDP, deci;t repre-
sents alternative measures of scal or political decentralization, t are time eects,
and i;t is a random error term. Our growth equation is similar to specications of-
ten used in the literature on aid eectiveness [see, e.g., Burnside and Dollar (2000),
Hansen and Tarp (2000), Easterly (2003), Easterly et al. (2004), Burnside and Dollar
(2004) and many others].
Our explanatory variables are taken from the aid and growth literature rather than
from the cross-country growth literature in order to achieve a better comparability
of our results to existing studies. It is unusual in the aid and growth literature to
include standard growth determinants such as investment or savings, as this decreases
the size of the sample to an extent, which would make a serious econometric analysis
impossible. Keep in mind that we are dealing with developing countries, for which we
have only very poor data in terms of quantity and quality.3
3See Rajan and Subramanian (2008) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
7As a control variable, we allow growth during period t to depend on yi;t, the logarithm
of real per capita GDP at the beginning of the period, to capture convergence eects.
Moreover, our growth equation also considers k exogenous control variables. These
variables are necessary to capture institutional and political factors that might aect
growth and help us to avoid an omitted variable bias. The rst control is ethnolinguis-
tic fractionalization, which the literature has shown to be correlated with poor growth
performance. A second control is the number of assassinations, which captures civil
unrest, as well as an interaction term between ethnic fractionalization and assassi-
nations [see, e.g., Burnside and Dollar (2000)]. Third, we consider the institutional
quality using a combined governance indicator. Fourth, we include ination in our
growth regressions, which serves as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. Finally, we
include regional dummies for sub-Saharan countries and East Asia, as it is commonly
known that Asian countries have performed well in the past, while sub-Saharan Africa
continues to perform poorly. These dierences are of a systematic nature, which we
cannot explain by control variables other than regional dummies. Note that not all of
our variables are time variant. Our measures of ethnic fractionalization, institutional
quality and the regional dummies capture time-invariant heterogeneities, while the
variation within these groups is explained by the initial GDP, assassinations, ina-
tion, aid, the degree of decentralization and interaction terms. Due to these data
restrictions, it is not possible to use a country xed-eects model.
Our theoretical discussion in section 2 suggests that the eectiveness of foreign aid
depends on decentralization; our growth equation thus includes not only measures of
aid and decentralization but also their interactions.
We estimate variants of equation 1 using a panel across eight four-year periods from
1966 through 1997. Our data set consists of up to 72 developing countries. The
bottleneck for our research is the availability of government nance data, which are
required to calculate decentralization measures. This restricts our sample to a maxi-
mum of 72 countries, which decreases to a minimum of 38 countries, depending on the
measurement concept of decentralization. Our set of countries is always congruent for
smaller samples with the whole set of 72 countries, although we thereby lose several
observations. However, always using the same sample of countries makes our sub-
samples comparable. The number of periods and countries in our sample implies a
maximum of 480 observations. Because we have only a maximum of 381 observations
in our regressions, our panel is unbalanced.
83.2 The data
The GDP and ination data are from Worldbank (2009).4 Alesina et al. (2003)
provide the data for ethnolinguistic fractionalization; the number of assassinations
come from the Easterly et al. (2004) data set. Our measure of institutional quality is
the mean value of the three governance indicators: `government eectiveness', `control
of corruption', and `rule of law', provided by Kaufman et al. (2009).
Our main variables of interest are the measures of development, foreign aid and de-
centralization. In line with the literature, we use the real GDP per capita growth
rate as a measure of economic development. Our measures of foreign aid are ex-
tracted from the OECD DAC database. We thus refer to the ocial development
assistance (ODA) rather than to measures of eective development assistance (EDA).
The main dierence between EDA and ODA is that EDA is the sum of grants and
the grant equivalents of ocial loans, whereas ODA includes both the direct grants
and concessional loans for which the grant component is above 25%. Which measure
to use and whether it should be used in current or constant U.S. dollars is widely
discussed in the literature [see, e.g., Chang et al. (1998)]. In the end, it should not
make any dierence in our context, as Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) have shown that
the Pearson correlation between nominal ODA/GDP and nominal EDA/GDP is 0.98,
and the correlation between nominal ODA/GDP and real EDA/GDP is 0.95 [see also
Roodman (2007)]. We decided to use the nominal ODA/GDP ratio, allowing us tu
use one additional four-year period in our panel.
The theoretical discussion has shown that aid modality should matter in the aid-
decentralization-growth nexus. We therefore distinguish between ve dierent aid
types (each as share of GDP): grants, loans, technical assistance, humanitarian aid,
and total net ODA. A meaningful measure to compare the relevance of the dierent
aid types is to relate them to the total net ODA. We thereby nd that at the end
of the 1990s, which is our last observation period, about 88% of the total net ODA
was composed of grants, while 12% was spent as loans (net). About one third of the
total net ODA is classied as technical assistance. This aid type includes development
assistance in terms of building up local infrastructure, schools, or health care, and it
incorporates the public advisory of the government in general, which also includes
expenditures in donor countries. This is why technical assistance cannot be declared
as the provision of local public goods, as one might rst presume. Humanitarian (food)
aid amounts to only 3% of the total net ODA. Aside from these dierent spending
categories, we are also able to distinguish between bilateral and multilateral aid. This
distinction might also be important in the aid-growth nexus, as single countries may
4See Table A.1 in the appendix for details. Table A.2 provides summary statistics of all considered
variables.
9be self-interested in their development policy [see Annen and Kosempel (2009)].
The last variables to be discussed in detail are our measures of decentralization. Se-
veral measurement concepts are used in the literature [see, e.g., Treisman (2002) and
Rodden (2004)]. We have seen from our theoretical discussion that the particular fe-
deral design of aid-receiving countries should matter for aid eectiveness. In general,
decentralization is viewed as the devolution of authority towards sub-national govern-
ments, with total government authority over society and economy perceived as xed.
Attempts to dene and measure decentralization have focused on scal authority ra-
ther than political authority. In our context, we are interested in both issues. First,
we need an indicator capturing whether aid is spent on the central or local level, and
second, we need a measure capturing whether local governments are involved in the
decision-making process, which assigns aid to particular projects.
The rst issue can be approximated by using measures of scal decentralization,
which can be calculated from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. The IMF-
GFS includes budgetary data on more than 60 aid-receiving countries. Those mea-
sures include the degree of expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC) and the degree
of revenue decentralization (REVDEC), which relate expenditures (revenues) of sub-
national governments to total government expenditures (revenues). The problem with
the IMF data is that it does not cover our whole observation period, which starts in
1966. The GFS data starts in the 1970s, and there are many missing values. We
thus compute the average of decentralization measures between the years 1966 and
1997 and we thereby lose the time-series properties of the decentralization data, but
we are able to substantially extend the number of observations in our estimations.
Both measures are commonly used in the literature on decentralization and growth
[see, e.g., Davoodi and Zou (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), and Woller and Phillips
(1998)]. However, these indicators do not necessarily reect sub-national govern-
ment autonomy in decision-making, as the central government may also determine
spending at the local level through central government legislation. To capture these
eects, a commonly used measure based on budgetary accounts is that of so-called
vertical imbalances (VERTIMB). This measure relates central government transfers
to sub-national government expenditures and is therefore a measure of the transfer
dependency of sub-national governments. Note that a high value of this measure
indicates little local autonomy, while all other decentralization measures we use are
dened such that a high value represents a high degree of decentralization. A nal
measure of scal decentralization reecting local government autonomy is the degree
of tax decentralization, which relates the tax revenues of sub-national governments
to total government revenues (TAXDEC). This is an alternative scal indicator of
sub-national government autonomy. These measures are imperfect to the extent that
10they do not reect the political dimension of the underlying decision-making process.
Assume, for example, that the central government determines the tax base and that
sub-national governments determine the tax rate. In this case, the tax decentraliza-
tion index might indicate a high degree of autonomy, although the central government
has the major inuence on sub-national revenues.
To capture the dimension of political decentralization, we refer to decentralization
measures provided by Daniel Treisman [see Treisman (2002) and Fan et al. (2009)].
The data set is built on earlier work on the operationalization of federalism by Lijphart
(1984), Elazar (1995), and others. A rst measure of political decentralization is a
dummy variable for those countries that have a federal constitution (FEDERAL).5
Only 8 out of the 72 countries in our sample are classied as federal, so the variance
of this measure is not very high. Nevertheless, higher variance is provided by the
measure for the number of vertical government tiers (TIERS), which ranges from 1 to
6 by denition. In our sample, the range is between 2 (Trinidad and Tobago) and 6
(Uganda and Senegal). This measure is important to test for double-marginalization
eects in decentralized systems [Shleifer and Vishny (1993)]. Treisman's data also
contain data on local elections, which are important for testing electoral accountability
arguments. One measure is a dummy variable that takes the value one if there are
elections at the lowest government level; a second dummy variable, takes the value
one if there are elections at the second-lowest government level. We combine these
measures to a new dummy variable indicating whether there are elections at any sub-
national level of government (BOTEL). In the context of local government eciency
it is very important to also include a measure of local autonomy. For this purpose,
Treisman creates several dummy variables based on the constitutions of countries. A
sub-national legislature is said to have `residual authority' if the constitution assigns
the exclusive right to legislate on issues that are not specically assigned to one level
of government (RESID). Another measure captures the `autonomy' of a sub-national
legislature. It is said to exist if the constitution reserves exclusive decision-making
power on task considered (AUTON).
In addition to the measures of scal and political decentralization, we use the share
of sub-national government employment in total government employment as a fur-
ther decentralization indicator (SUBEMPL) which cannot be assigned to either of
the two categories. The necessary data on public sector employment are provided by
the International Labor Organization's (ILO) LABORSTA database. This decentra-
5The following criteria have to be fullled to be counted as a federal country: a country has at least
two levels of government that which share parts of the executive and legislative authority; the sub-national
governments have representation in the federal parliament (second chamber); there is a duty to obtain
consent on constitutional amendments; a constitutional jurisdiction solves disputes between organs of state;
institutions foster collaboration [see Watts (2008)].
11lization measure is essential for testing the hypothesis that decentralization increases
corruption and cronyism, as local bureaucrats have more opportunities for face-to-
face interactions with rms and individuals than their central counterparts [Bardhan
(2002), Prud'homme (1995)]. From this perspective, countries with a greater share of
public-sector employees located at sub-national levels may be more corrupt, and fo-
reign aid may thus be less eective. At the same time, a greater share of sub-national
government employment increases the probability of being detected in corrupt acti-
vities and embezzlements so that the sign of the net eect is ex ante ambiguous. We
use all discussed decentralization measures to test the impact of decentralization on
the aid-growth nexus.
3.3 Estimation results
In the following, we test our hypothesis that the relationship between foreign aid and
growth is conditional on the degree of decentralization and that both aid modality as
well as federal style matter in this context. The data on 7 aid types and 10 dierent
decentralization measures imply 70 regressions without testing for endogeneity and
robustness. This is denitely more information than we can present in detailed tables
containing regression coecients and diagnostics. We thus decided to discuss one
result in detail, which helps the reader to understand the underlying methodology
and potential threats. All other results are summarized in table 2 at the end of this
section.
Table 1 presents the estimation results including the degree of expenditure decentra-
lization (EXPDEC) and the total net ODA. In column (1), we show OLS estimations
without interaction of aid and the decentralization measure; in column (2), we added
the interaction term (ODAEXPDEC) to address whether the eectiveness of total
net ODA depends on the degree of expenditure decentralization. In the following two
columns, we repeat these estimations by applying the two-stage least-squares (TSLS)
estimation procedure instrumented for foreign aid by its one-period (four-year avera-
ged) lagged values, as donor countries might respond to negative growth shocks by
providing more assistance. In this case, aid is inuenced by growth, and we would
have an endogeneity bias. Our instrumentation strategy follows Burnside and Dollar
(2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), and others.
The estimation without the interaction of aid and decentralization (column 1) shows
that the degree of expenditure decentralization is positively associated with economic
growth for our sample of developing countries. This result is in line with the theoretical
predictions [see, e.g., Oates (1972)] and previous empirical ndings [see, e.g., Iimi
(2005)]. Noteworthy is that foreign aid has a signicant negative impact on growth
12in the OLS regressions, while the eect disappears when controlling for endogeneity.
Again, this result is supported by the majority of literature, which nds no signicant
direct eect of aid on growth [see, e.g., Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2003),
Easterly et al. (2004), and others].
Table 1: Estimation results: Expenditure decentralization and total net ODA
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
OLS TSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial GDP -0.018 -0.012 -0.005 0.002
(-1.07) (-0.71) (-0.29) (0.10)
ethnic fractionalization -0.022 -0.010 0.002 0.020
(-0.66) (-0.32) (0.06) (0.59)
assassinations -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.019
(-1.01) (-1.14) (-1.08) (-1.23)
ethnic  assassinations 0.011 0.009 0.021 0.017
(0.30) (0.27) (0.57) (0.49)
governance 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.046***
(3.03) (3.06) (2.95) (3.13)
log(1+ination) -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.087***
(-3.64) (-3.91) (-3.64) (-4.08)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.013 -0.011 -0.041** -0.037*
(-0.56) (-0.46) (-2.14) (-1.93)
East-Asia 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.103***
(8.44) (8.67) (8.29) (8.17)
expenditure decentralization 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002***
(1.78) (3.03) (2.25) (4.01)
total net ODA -0.895*** -0.374 -0.168 0.463
(-2.87) (-0.94) (-0.43) (1.00)
expenditure decentralization  ODA -0.034*** -0.044***
(-2.92) (-3.75)
Period dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 246 (46) 246 (46) 214 (44) 214 (44)
adj.-R
2 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.35
All t-statistics reported below the coecient estimates are based on robust standard errors [see Beck
and Katz (1995)]. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-signicance-level, ** for 95%
and *** for more than 99%.
As we are primarily interested in the impact of scal decentralization on aid eecti-
veness, we focus on the specication using the interaction term. Column (2) shows
that the coecient of our decentralization measure is signicant and positive, the co-
ecient of aid is insignicant, and the coecient of the interaction term is signicant
and negative. However, we are not particularly interested in the individual statistical
signicance of either of these terms. Instead, we want to know their joint signicance
or, more correctly, the marginal eect of aid on growth.6 The marginal eect can be
6For an excellent overview on do's and don'ts in interaction models, see Brambor et al. (2006).
13calculated by the derivation of equation (1) with respect to the aid term:
@^ y
@aid
= 1 + 3  dec: (2)
The interaction model implies that the eect of a change in aid on growth depends
on the value of the conditioning variable decentralization. While it is possible to
calculate the marginal eect using equation 2 and the results obtained in Table 1, it
is not possible to do likewise for the standard errors. The standard error of interest
is:
^  @^ y
@aid =
q
var(1) + dec2  var(3) + 2  dec  cov(1;3): (3)
The standard errors are used to calculate the condence bands around the marginal
eects. To help the reader see more precisely how the marginal eect of aid on
growth varies by the degree of expenditure decentralization in developing countries,
this marginal eect is plotted in Figure 1. Note that we refer to results we receive
using the TSLS estimation procedure (column (4)). The gure also includes condence




























0.90 confidence level 0.99 confidence level
Figure 1: Marginal eect of total net ODA on growth: expenditure decentralization
The cuto value of decentralization is the value of decentralization for which @^ y=@aid =
0 is 10.52 in the fully specied regression. Our results imply that for about 50% of
countries in our sample, the total net ODA is not signicantly associated with eco-
nomic growth. For the remaining countries, foreign aid has a negative impact on
economic growth. The eect strengthens as the degree of expenditure decentraliza-
tion increases. The marginal eect is statistically dierent from zero, with more than
90% (99%) condence with a degree of expenditure decentralization exceeding roughly
1427% (35%). In other words, the impact of aid on growth is signicantly negative in
one third of the countries in our sample. Our results imply that the total net ODA
is less eective in countries with a high degree of expenditure decentralization. The
eciency-enhancing eect of scal decentralization is overcompensated by negative
ones, as there are coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs,
and corruption.
Our ndings are in line with Lessmann and Markwardt (2009), who show that the
impact of decentralization on the aid-growth relationship is more important than the
`good policy' hypothesis proposed by Burnside and Dollar (2000). However, depar-
ting from this study, it is of interest to know whether this result varies with the
measurement concept of decentralization and/or the aid modality. There are fea-
tures of decentralized countries that strengthen accountability, such as local elections.
Additionally, there are types of aid that are more dicult to embezzle or to waste
than other ones. To study these issues, we apply similar estimations to our discus-
sed example, using alternative decentralization measures while distinguishing between
dierent aid types. Table 2 summarizes our results.
Table 2: Summary of estimation results
Fiscal decentralization Political decentralization
Aid type expdec revdec vertimb taxdec federal tiers botel auton resid subempl
grants {/{ {/{ ({/{) {/{ ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+)
loans ({/{) ({/{) (+/{) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) +/{ ({/+) ({/+) (+/{)
technical (+/{) (+/{) ({/+) (+/{) ({/+) (+/{) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) {/+
human ({/{) ({/{) ({/{) ({/{) {/{ ({/{) ({/{) ({/+) ({/{) ({/{)
ODA total {/{ {/{ ({/{) {/{ ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+) ({/+)
multilateral {/{ ({/{) {/+ ({/{) ({/{) ({/{) {/+ ({/{) ({/{) ({/+)
bilateral +/{ (+/{) {/+ (+/{) ({/{) ({/{) {/+ ({/{) ({/+) ({/+)
Note: The rst symbol in each cell indicates the sign of the coecient of the aid variable, the second
symbol indicates the sign of the aiddecentralization interaction term. Results in parentheses are not
signicant at conventional condence levels.
The table reads as follows: Each cell summarizes the result of one OLS regression com-
bining one particular aid type (rows) with one decentralization measure (columns).
The rst symbol indicates the sign of the regression coecient of the respective aid
variable. The second symbol concerns the interaction term of aid and the decentra-
lization measure. For example, \{/{" reads as the negative eect of aid on growth
and negative sign of the interaction term with the decentralization measure. If the
marginal eect of aid on growth is insignicant for all values of the underlying de-
centralization variable, the results are put in parentheses. This does not necessarily
mean that the coecient of the interaction term is insignicant. Nevertheless, this
is not the relevant criterion for evaluating the impact of decentralization on aid ef-
15fectiveness. A meaningful interpretation of results is only possible in cases where the
marginal eects are signicant.
Let us now turn to the alternative measures of scal and political decentralization.
The degree of expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC) has signicant eects in seve-
ral cases. It worsens the eectiveness of grants as well as total net ODA, irrespective
of whether aid is given on a multilateral or a bilateral basis. The eects of the degree
of revenue decentralization (REVDEC) are quite similar. Vertical imbalances (VER-
TIMB) do not impact the relationship between a single aid type and growth, although
the eect on multilateral and bilateral aid eectiveness is positive. The degree of tax
decentralization (TAXDEC) incorporates sub-national government autonomy to some
extent. The eect on the eectiveness of grants as well as on the total net ODA is
again negatively impacted by this decentralization measure. The main result from
this exercise is that scal decentralization has a negative impact on the eectiveness
of total net ODA, which is based on the negative eect on the eectiveness of grants.
Keep in mind that grants are the major source of all aid types. Moreover, we are
not able to identify a signicant eect of scal decentralization on the eectiveness of
types of aid other than grants.
The estimation results using measures of political decentralization can be discus-
sed very briey, as we nd no signicant marginal eects of foreign aid except in
one specication: the eectiveness of bilateral aid is increased by sub-national elec-
tions (BOTEL). The positive eect is in line with our expectations, as local elections
strengthen government accountability. The eect is statistically signicant when only
bilateral aid is considered. However, if we ignore the conventional condence levels for
a moment, we nd an interesting dierence in the measures of scal decentralization
in general: the sign of the interaction variable of measures of political decentralization
and foreign aid is positive - although insignicant - in almost all cases. This indicates
that political decentralization is, in contrast to scal decentralization, at least not
harmful to the eectiveness of foreign aid.
The last column summarizes results using the sub-national share of public-sector
employment (SUBEMPL) as a decentralization measure. This is the only decentra-
lization measure, where one of the other aid types except for grants turns out to
signicantly impact growth depending on the degree of decentralization. The impact
of technical assistance on economic growth increases with the sub-national employ-
ment share. We plotted the marginal eect of technical assistance on growth in gure
2. In countries with a low level of decentralization, the marginal impact of technical
assistance on growth is signicantly negative. With a degree of decentralization ex-
ceeding 50%, the negative impact of aid on growth disappears. Decentralization can
thus also have a positive impact on aid eectiveness. The type of aid and the measure


























0.90 confidence level 0.99 confidence level
Figure 2: Marginal eect of technical aid on growth: public sector employment decentralization
Turning to the dierent types of aid, we cannot identify robust dierences. The
eectiveness of grants, being the most important modality of aid spending is impacted
by measures of scal decentralization. Accordingly, the ndings on the total net
ODA look quite similar. The signs of the coecients are also similar if we consider
loans as the type of aid used. However, the eects are not statistically signicant.
Technical assistance is denitely less harmful for growth and may even be a positive
inuence. Humanitarian aid is always negatively correlated with economic growth,
and the eect is worsened by decentralization. In this case, due to the apparent
endogeneity problem, we do not want to stress these ndings. Finally, we also cannot
nd meaningful dierences between multilateral and bilateral aid.
4 Summary and conclusions
The growing literature on the eectiveness of foreign aid has thus far been unable to
identify a robust direct relationship between aid and growth. Accordingly, researchers
start to focus on the conditions determining the success of aid. In almost all existing
studies, the federal structure as a determinant of aid eectiveness has been neglected.
The aim of our paper was to close this gap in the literature and to investigate whether
the growth impact of foreign aid depends on the federal structure of aid-receiving
countries and/or the aid modality.
17For this purpose, we estimated the impact of dierent aid types on growth by consi-
dering the interdependency between aid and various decentralization measures. Our
estimations are based on a panel of 72 developing countries covering the period from
1966 to 1997. The results can be summarized as follows: Measures of scal decentra-
lization negatively impact the eect of aid on growth, and the results are statistically
signicant for grants and total net ODA. In almost all regressions, measures of poli-
tical decentralization have no signicant impact on the aid-growth nexus. However,
the signs of the (insignicant) coecients suggest that the relationship may be the
converse. In some cases, we identify a positive impact of decentralization on aid ef-
fectiveness, such as in the case of technical assistance and the sub-national share of
public sector employment. We can thus conclude that the aid modalities and the
particular federal design both matter in the aid-growth relationship.
Our study provides some important implications for the design of anti-poverty pro-
grams. Both national and international development organizations consider public-
sector decentralization as part of their development strategy. This is in line with
our nding that most measures of decentralization have a positive impact on growth
in developing countries. However, at the same time, some institutional features of
decentralization undermine the eectiveness of foreign aid. Therefore, the design of
anti-poverty programs should carefully consider how both instruments { foreign aid
and decentralization { work together. The decentralization of public-sector employ-
ment can be a promising strategy in this context.
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21Table A.1: Data sources & denitions
Variable Denition Source
real per capita GDP
growth
Growth rate of 4-year-averaged GDP per capita in 2000 $
prices
WDI 2006
Log of initial GDP Log of initial real GDP per capita in 2000 $ prices at the start
of each period
WDI 2006
ethnic fractionalization Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is computed as one minus
Herndahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares, and reects
the probability that two randomly selected individuals from
a population belonged to dierent groups.
Alesina et al. (2003)
assassinations Assassinations: number of assassinations per million popula-
tion, see Banks (2002) for details.
Easterly et al. (2004)
institutional quality Mean of three governance indicators (1996): `government ef-
fectiveness', `control of corruption', and `rule of law'
Kaufman et al. (2009)
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federal (FEDERAL) Dummy for countries with a federal constitution Treisman (2002) and
Elazar (1995)
vertical tiers (TIERS) Number of vertical government tiers Treisman (2002) and
Fan et al. (2009)
local elections (BOTEL) Dummy variable, which is one if a country has elections at
the lowest or second lowest tier of government.
Treisman (2002) and
Fan et al. (2009)
local autonomy (AUTON) Local jurisdictions have a certain amount of `autonomy' re-
garding a given question, if the constitution reserves exclusive
decision-making power on that question.
Treisman (2002) and
Fan et al. (2009)
residual authority
(RESID)
A sub-national legislature is said to have `residual authority',
if the constitution assigns the exclusive right to legislate on
issues that are not specically assigned to one level of govern-
ment.
Treisman (2002) and
Fan et al. (2009)
employment decentraliza-
tion (SUBEMPL)
Share of sub-national government employment in total govern-
ment employment
ILO LABORSTA
Table A.2: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
real per capita GDP growth 669 0.068 0.142 0.773 -0.526
Log of initial GDP 789 3760.655 3584.693 27761.900 418.556
ethnic fractionalization 864 0.494 0.251 0.930 0.002
assassinations 530 0.268 0.799 9.750 0.000
institutional quality 864 2.189 0.624 4.596 1.154
ination 649 42.945 210.550 3357.528 -3.242
EXPDEC 552 17.259 14.511 50.707 2.439
REVDEC 552 13.917 13.272 51.436 1.176
VERTIMB 456 35.303 27.157 98.122 0.139
TAXDEC 492 7.520 9.409 47.187 0.028
FEDERAL 864 0.111 0.314 1.000 0.000
TIERS 864 3.833 1.065 6.000 1.000
BOTEL 564 0.670 0.465 1.000 0.000
AUTON 852 0.113 0.316 1.000 0.000
RESID 852 0.099 0.298 1.000 0.000
SUBEMPL 504 36.939 21.597 92.857 10.000
grants 584 0.030 0.038 0.270 0.000
loans 584 0.003 0.010 0.093 -0.094
technical 584 0.011 0.013 0.077 0.000
human 455 0.003 0.006 0.070 -0.001
total net ODA 739 0.053 0.065 0.417 -0.006
multilateral 341 0.660 0.991 8.379 -0.064
bilateral 347 1.470 1.837 11.909 0.000
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